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NEW “UNBUNDLING” RULES:  WILL THE FCC FINALLY OPEN 
UP CABLE BROADBAND? 
This iBrief discusses a recent Court of Appeals decision remanding FCC 
rules on the “unbundling” of Internet services by telephone exchange 
carriers. These rules ordered many Internet service providers to share 
their equipment with competitors, so that consumers could choose their 
providers instead of having to accept all services from the company who 
installed the physical Internet connection.  Cable Internet providers are 
not included in these rules. This iBrief predicts that cable broadband 
operators will soon be governed by the same “unbundling” provisions as 
other ISPs. 
The Federal Communications Commission (“FCC”) has been sent back to the drawing 
board to rewrite its open access rules for the companies whose wires, loops and switches carry the 
Internet across the country and into the homes and offices of America.  What the Commission 
decides will have major implications for the future of the Internet.  The FCC rules, which granted 
new competitors access to incumbent companies’ equipment, were supposed to increase 
competition and prevent telephone monopolies from becoming Internet monopolies.  But the FCC 
ignored more than half the problem, disregarding the competitive impact of cable companies who 
provide Internet service.  The D.C. Circuit Court finally took note of the glaring disparity and 
ordered the FCC to reconsider.1 
Hometown, USA v. FCC 
Municipalities around the country have been trying to make one of the FCC’s orders 
make sense by requiring cable carriers (who also provide Internet service) to share their hardware 
with competitive Internet Service Providers (“ISPs”).2  Local telephone exchange carriers already 
have to share their equipment with incoming local exchange carriers who want to provide Internet 
service.3  But courts are not drawing this analogy; instead, they keep striking down requirements 
that would force cable providers to share hardware.4 
At least two Circuit Courts have denied municipalities the ability to provide a level 
playing field for all incoming competitors seeking to provide Internet services.5  Incumbent local 
telephone exchange carriers (“ILECs”) – those companies who own the equipment over which 
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telecommunications service travels – are required to share their equipment with competitors 
(Competitive Local Telephone Exchange Carriers, or “CLECs”) seeking to provide Internet 
services to consumers.6  In contrast, cable companies providing Internet service along with cable 
services over their broadband systems are exempt from this rule.7  Henrico County, Virginia tried 
to condition one company’s transfer of a cable franchise to AT&T, after a merger, on that 
company providing “open access” to competitors.8  In MediaOne Group Inc. v. County of 
Henrico, the cable company offered a “bundled” service to customers, which combined its cable 
service with Internet services over its cable modem platform.9  Customers who wanted cable 
television had to take both services together, meaning those customers who wanted a different 
Internet service provider would have a strong disincentive to acquire that redundant service.10  
Henrico County’s “open access” condition required MediaOne to open its broadband pipeline to 
unaffiliated ISPs at the same rates, terms and conditions as it provides to itself and its affiliates.11  
The district court held that the County violated the Communications Act because it required 
MediaOne to provide telecommunications facilities as a condition of transfer, a condition that 
“cable operators” escape under the Telecommunications Act of 1996.12  Various telephone 
companies joined Henrico County in the suit, since those companies providing DSL services, 
regulated as telecommunications services, were required to share their equipment with 
competitors.13  These companies chafed at the regulatory disparity created by the imbalance in the 
rules.14 
The City of Portland attempted to enforce a similar franchise transfer condition on 
AT&T’s “@home” service, after AT&T’s merger with TCI Cable.15  Portland-area ILECs called 
for open access to TCI’s cable broadband network to create a “level playing field” with the 
ILECs.16  The court in Portland recognized that the parties wanted them to consider what national 
policy on open access to the Internet was appropriate, but they flatly declined.17  The court 
showed deference to the FCC and determined that @home was outside the scope of the FCC 
                                                                                                                                                              
5 E.g., MediaOne, 257 F.3d at 365; Portland, 216 F.3d at 871. 
6 47 U.S.C. § 251(c)(3). 
7 Portland, 216 F.3d at 879. 
8 MediaOne, 257 F.3d at 360. 
9 Id. at 359-60. 
10 Id. at 360. 
11 Id.  
12 Id. at 361. 
13 Id. at 364. 
14 MediaOne, 257 F.3d at 364.  
15 Portland, 216 F.3d at 875. 
16 Id. 
because it was a cable operator providing an information service and a cable telecommunications 
service (distinctions discussed infra).18  These classifications meant Portland was prohibited from 
regulating cable broadband Internet access.19  The result was that Henrico County, Virginia and 
Portland, Oregon failed in their efforts to increase competition and decrease monopolization of 
Internet service in their region. 
Defining Cable Broadband Internet Service 
A major foundation of both of these decisions is the classification placed around these 
companies.20  Both courts decided the plaintiff was, at least in part, a cable service providing 
telecommunications services, and therefore fell outside the bounds of the Telecommunications 
Act.21  This classification removes them from the requirements of the Act, because the Act 
specifically states, “if a cable operator or affiliate thereof is engaged in the provision of 
telecommunications service … the provisions of this title shall not apply to such cable operator or 
affiliate for the provision of telecommunications services.”22  The Act defines 
“telecommunications” as the “transmission, between or among points specified by the user, of 
information of the user’s choosing, without change in the form or content of the information as 
sent and received.”23  This definition is not sufficiently keyed to the reality of the Internet.  
Consumers search or surf the Internet and interact with information, which surprises them at 
every turn.  The familiar experience of being bombarded with pop-up ads while traversing a 
website is just one example of how the Internet is often not “transmission … of information of the 
user’s choosing.”  Also, Internet users do not tend to specify the points to and from which 
information is being transmitted.  Communicating on the Internet is not like placing a phone call, 
where the caller enters a number of his or her choosing and, thereby, specifies the points between 
which information is transmitted.  It is often more like casting a wide net, into uncharted seas, 
with no idea where the catch will come from. 
The problem lies in determining what cable operators are providing if it cannot be 
classified as a telecommunications service. The FCC has invited “comments on alternative 
approaches to classifying cable modem service and the cable modem platform under the 
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Communications Act” to answer this very question.24  Courts have rejected, and rightly so, the 
suggestion that cable operators are providing a cable service.25  The Act defines “cable services” 
as “(A) the one-way transmission to subscribers of (i) video programming, or (ii) other 
programming service, and (B) subscriber interaction, if any, which is required for the selection or 
use of such video programming or other programming service.”26  The Ninth Circuit described 
the “essence of cable service [as the] … one-way transmission of programming to subscribers 
generally.”27  Clearly, this does not describe the Internet, which users transform through their 
input, and which is a two-way medium, as any frequenter of ‘chat rooms’ could attest. 
Cable operators may be providing “Internet access service,” formerly called “information 
services,” defined as “a service that enables users to access content, information, electronic mail, 
or other services offered over the Internet, and may also include access to proprietary content, 
information and other services as part of a package of services offered to consumers.”28  
However, the term does not include user input into that definition, a key part of the Internet for 
many who create their own web pages and even operate businesses over those web pages.  
“Information services” are not, and have never been, subject to regulation under the Act, so that 
classification would do little to help the FCC resolve the access quandary.29  A new classification 
could settle the issue, but whatever the means, the FCC has been ordered to reconsider their 
access rules. 
An Order for New Rules 
The D.C. Circuit Court of Appeals finally noted and challenged the disparity between 
those who are and those who are not regulated in this area.30  The court sent the FCC back to the 
drawing board on two of its orders – the Local Competition Order and the Line Sharing Order.31  
Incumbent local carriers sought review of the two rules, the second of which related to cable 
broadband operators.32  The court pointed out that the second rule, the ‘Line Sharing Order,’ 
ignored the market force of cable broadband operators.33  The rule required that these ILECs 
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“unbundle” the high frequency portion of copper loops, which transmit information ranging from 
analog telephone service to DSL, to allow new local carriers to provide telephone service and 
DSL access at the same time.34  ILECs also had to remove voice-band enhancing equipment on 
the loops, which tends to interfere with DSL service.35 
The major flaw the court found in this rule was that by requiring ILECs to share loops 
with CLECs, the FCC had “completely failed to consider the relevance of competition in 
broadband services coming from cable.”36  The FCC itself had confirmed the dominance of cable 
in the Internet market.37  Cable companies have 54% of existing high-speed lines, almost double 
the 28% held by DSL.38  With access comes popularity, since broadband allows users to access 
the Internet at speeds 50 to several hundred times faster than through conventional modems.39  It 
is an unfortunate oversight, considering the FCC expected its unbundling plan to lead to “rapid 
introduction of competition in all markets” and promote “facilities-based competition, 
investment, and innovation.”40   
Real competition and growth in this industry requires making the cable companies, which 
provide bundled Internet and cable access, a part of the regulated class.  The court noted that 
mandatory unbundling comes at a high cost, including “disincentives to research and 
development by both ILECs and CLECs and the tangled management inherent in shared use of a 
common resource,” which are particularly large burdens, if the purported goals are not being 
achieved.41  The court remanded the rule to the FCC, because the non-inclusion of cable meant 
there was no reason to think its unbundling requirement would bring on a significant 
enhancement of competition.42  Therefore, it seems these communications requirements cannot 
survive without the inclusion of cable broadband operators.   
The court likened the FCC’s misstep in this area to their error regarding the Local 
Competition Order, which required ILECs to unbundle network elements and provide them to 
CLECs.43  Although their own rules require unbundling only if “lack of access to that element 
materially diminishes a requesting carrier’s ability to provide the services it seeks to offer,” the 
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FCC ordered this unbundling across the board, in every “geographic or customer market.”44  The 
court questioned the FCC’s decision to disregard the state of competition in any particular 
market.45  The court pointed out that subsidization by state regulatory commissions in the name of 
universal service means rural and/or residential subscribers are usually undercharged while urban 
and business markets are overcharged.46  Common sense tells us that incoming competition will 
not go to markets where customers are charged below cost.47  So it is no surprise that CLECs 
have invested heavily in the overcharging markets.48  The result is a situation in which the rules 
do little to further the goals they are meant to achieve.  Once it noted this, the D.C. Circuit was 
consistent in its message for the FCC – rewrite your rules to fit their purpose. 
The Struggle Continues 
The court noted the “extraordinary complexity of the Commission’s task” but provided 
the FCC with no further guidance.49  The task is complicated by the ambiguity of the 
Telecommunications Act.  The Supreme Court has said it is “a gross understatement to say that 
the 1996 Act is not a model of clarity.”50  In fact, the FCC was already forced to rewrite the 
unbundling access rules; the Supreme Court decided the Commission had exceeded the scope of 
the Act by giving competitors “blanket access” to unbundled network elements without 
compelling those competitors to prove the level of need required in the Act.51  The Court stated 
that the FCC’s low bar created a situation where it was “hard to imagine when the incumbent’s 
failure to give access to the element would not constitute an impairment.”52  As a result of that 
ruling, the FCC revised its standards for unbundling and created the ‘Local Competition Order’ 
and the ‘Line Sharing Order.’53  Now both have been remanded to the Commission for review.54 
All of this toil would have been unnecessary had a bill introduced in the House of 
Representatives passed.  The “Internet Freedom Act” (IFA) stated that “broadband access 
transport providers” had to give fair, “anticompetitive” contracts to ISPs, who want to use the 
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pre-existing broadband hardware for their service.55  The IFA would provide unaffiliated service 
providers the same deal cable broadband operators give themselves and their affiliates.56  A 
violation of the IFA would be considered a breach of the antitrust prohibitions in the Sherman 
Act.57  However, the last committee hearing on the bill took place in July 2000, so it looks 
doubtful that Congress will resolve this issue and take the pressure off of the FCC. 
Conclusion 
It is time for the FCC to get the rules right.  Cable broadband operators providing Internet 
service have been free riders in this arena for too long.  The inevitable result of the FCC’s Line 
Sharing Order would be that cable broadband operators are ushered into the ‘favorite son’ 
position, with regards to providing Internet service, while non-cable exchange carriers are forced 
to offer their hardware to competitors at cheap rates.  Such favoritism works against the stated 
goals of the Telecommunications Act of 1996, which are “promot[ing] competition and … 
encourag[ing] the rapid deployment of new telecommunications technologies.”58  If cable 
broadband operators are allowed to automatically include Internet service into their cable offering 
without giving competitors the opportunity to lease their facilities, alternatives to an Internet 
provided by the major cable operators will cease to exist.  Competition would be nil.  Also, a 
company, or oligarchy of companies, dominating a market in this way has no incentive to develop 
new technology, when their customers are bound to use their systems regardless of the quality.   
After the D.C. Circuit Court of Appeal’s recent decision, the FCC will likely finally 
include cable broadband operators into the fold of these “open access” requirements.  It is where 
they belonged all along.   
But you don’t have to tell Henrico County and Portland – they already knew that. 
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